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Agricultural Services and 
Decentralisation in Kenya
Kenya will vote on a new constitution in August 2010. The document proposes greater decentralisation of government 
with elected governors heading 47 counties that 
will replace the current system of provinces and 
districts. This realignment of the institutional 
landscape presents a number of opportunities 
and challenges for agricultural service provision 
in the country. This brief draws on case studies 
in four districts of Kenya – Mwingi, Rachuonyo, 
Eldoret West and Nyeri South – that were 
conducted in 2007 and 2009 to explore the roles 
and performance of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and other rural development ministries in the 
country1 to provide context to discussions that 
need to be held in Kenya about the delivery of 
agricultural extension and other services in 
Kenya under the new constitutional order. The 
new constitution has the national ministry 
making policy, but crop and animal husbandry, 
fisheries, disease control and other services 
being undertaken at the county level. 
The Roles of the Ministry of 
Agriculture at the District Level
Kenya is a very diverse country in agro-ecolog-
ical terms and the four case studies were chosen 
to reflect this. Nyeri South is located close to 
Nairobi and receives good rainfall. Tea, coffee 
and dairy are all well developed within the 
district, which has high population density and 
small farm sizes and a poverty rate well below 
the national average. The district has well devel-
oped input supply systems, and financial 
services are provided through SACCOs and 
commercial banks such that even smallholder 
farmers can access credit.  Eldoret West is part 
of the high potential maize zone of the North 
Rift, which supplies cereals surpluses to much 
of the remainder of the country, and enjoys 
average farm sizes well above those of the other 
case study districts. By contrast, Rachuonyo is 
a district of moderate agro-ecological potential 
and generally small farms, poor road links to its 
nearest major market, Kisumu, no banks or 
sources of credit, and few input suppliers. 
Mwingi is a semi-arid area that regularly receives 
food aid. Given these differences, one would 
expect the priorities of the ministries of 
Agriculture and rural development to differ 
across districts, not just in terms of commodity 
focus (different crops, livestock, fisheries), but 
also in terms of activities undertaken, as the 
general levels of market development vary from 
district to district.
Stakeholders in the different districts had 
similar perceptions of the activities undertaken 
by the Ministry of Agriculture – heavily 
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extension focussed, but extension effort less 
than they would wish for, and following an 
agenda set at national level. Needs however 
differed by area with farmers in Nyeri South 
feeling that basic extension services do not need 
to be provided by government and that it should 
focus on cross-cutting issues such as soil fertility 
and the regulation of input quality that are not 
picked up within individual commodity chains. 
They recognised that the root causes of the 
decline of coffee - poor performance and 
accountability of coffee cooperatives - could not 
be sorted out by the local MoA office. In 
Rachuonyo, in contrast, farmers felt that market 
chain development would not happen unless 
MoA performs a coordinating role to bring 
different stakeholders - public, private, and NGO 
– together.
Farmer and Stakeholder 
Perceptions
In focus group discussions farmers and other 
stakeholders charted the ups and downs of 
agricultural sector performance within their 
district over past 4-5 decades and described the 
MoA contribution to this. Contributions focused 
on increased or decreased extension effort, but 
also at times included facilitating access to 
inputs like new seed varieties and subsidised 
fertiliser. The discussions indicated that national 
policy fluctuations, e.g. changes in resources to 
support extension effort, national efforts to 
support certain commodities or regions, are felt 
at local level. For example, the first decade under 
President Moi was good for Eldoret West, but 
was the start of decline for others (e.g Nyeri). All 
areas saw the 1990s as the low point for agri-
cultural performance. It was marked by declining 
extension staff numbers, demoralised staff and 
the collapse of farmer support institutions such 
as Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) and the 
Kenya Farmers Association (KFA) that had bene-
fited producers all over the country. Their 
collapse was due to poor management 
ultimately traceable to politicisation. The post 
2002 era under President Kibaki was a mixed 
story – revitalisation of KCC, some additional 
extension effort, but still inadequate to needs, 
challenges in tea and, surprisingly from a polit-
ical perspective, failure to revive coffee.
Overall stakeholder and farmer observation 
is that extension management reforms (e.g. 
Training and Visit, concentration of effort on 
selected focal areas, demand-driven extension) 
have not fundamentally changed the effective-
ness with which MoA operates i.e. the efficiency 
with which available funds are used. Indeed 
there was some farmer scepticism about all of 
these mentioned reforms! They have seen and 
heard it all before, but nothing really changes.
The Past Decade: Budgets Up but 
Still Significant Inefficiencies
Between 2003 and 2009 the budget of the 
Ministry of Agriculture has been on an upward 
trend. This has been driven by the new govern-
ments’ desire to demonstrate improved service 
delivery to the electorate, and effective lobbying 
by well-connected officials within government 
including politically ambitious Ministers for 
Agriculture from a key agricultural zone. The 
government commitment to the Maputo 
Declaration to spend 10 percent of its budget 
on agriculture was used as a bargaining chip, 
although the target has yet to be reached.  
Unfortunately, part of the gains from 
increased funding have been immediately offset 
by inefficiency losses due to proliferation of 
ministries within the agricultural sector. These 
rose from 3 in 2003 to 10 in 2009 - the result of 
the exigencies of coalition building within a 
patronage based political system. The district 
studies show that coordination between staff 
of the new ministries at district level works toler-
ably well. They have worked together before, 
still have offices close together, and share 
resources and vehicles. The main sector minis-
tries – Agriculture, Livestock Development, 
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Fisheries and Cooperative Development - also 
receive some common funding through the 
National Agriculture and Livestock Extension 
Project and there are nascent efforts at coordi-
nated program development, activities and 
funding through the Agricultural Sector 
Coordination Unit - ASCU. However, the various 
ministries are very unequally funded and rela-
tive funding within a district never fully reflects 
local circumstances. Thus Rachuonyo, a rela-
tively dry district by the lake, has few resources 
for fisheries, one veterinarian and a few assis-
tants on bicycles; Mwingi, a semi-arid district, 
has a bigger budget for crop agriculture than 
for livestock; Nyeri South has an abundance of 
veterinary staff despite the low incidence of 
livestock diseases. All the districts now have a 
large financial allocation for aquaculture under 
2008-09 Economic Stimulus Package, but many 
have no Fisheries officer. Eldoret West also has 
inadequate veterinary support, and a single 
irrigation officer despite high demand for both 
services.
Amongst the agricultural and rural develop-
ment ministries, MoA is the best resourced and 
funded, but even its performance is hindered 
by inefficiencies in internal resource allocation 
at district level: 1) there is an insufficient opera-
tional budget for the number of staff employed; 
2) there are too many staff in offices relative to 
field-based. Rachuonyo, for example, had 31 
professional “office-based” (i.e. divisional and 
district) staff “supporting” just seven front line 
extension workers (FEWs) in 2007. Staff reported 
that recently recruited graduates are not partic-
ularly keen on undertaking front line work. 
The imbalance in office- relative to field-
based staff is the result of: i) a long-term freeze 
on recruitment, ii) efforts to enhance the quali-
fications of existing staff, iii) a policy that staff 
with a diploma are entitled to a post in a divi-
sional office, whilst those with a degree are 
entitled to a post in a district office. However, 
due to inadequate transport, staff are promoted 
out of regular touch with the farmers whom they 
are supposed to serve. Those who remain as 
FEWs are demoralised. Some have remained in 
the same pay grade for many up to 10-15 years 
because there is no opportunity to upgrade their 
education from the certificate level. (Some divi-
sional staff are similarly “stuck” with their 
diplomas). There is also a sense that hard work 
makes no difference to reward or remuneration, 
so why bother? The basic problem is the central 
control over hiring and promotions as per Civil 
Service rules. Local managers have little influ-
ence over staff deployment, motivation and 
promotions, so actual performance and dili-
gence count for little. An additional irritant 
(raised by FEWs in both Rachuonyo and Nyeri 
South) was the scrapping of the Ksh 300 per 
month bicycle allowances for FEWs.
The Potential of Decentralisation
There was strong awareness amongst stake-
holders (farmer representatives, stockists, and 
even ministry officials themselves) of the 
constraints affecting MoA performance. There 
was a strong desire – by farmers, stakeholders 
and staff - for greater local control over budgeting 
and planning, so as to match local service provi-
sion more closely to local needs. In particular, 
participants recommended that the budget for 
all agriculture-related ministries should be put 
into “one pot” at district level – even if (for polit-
ical reasons) the proliferation of ministries 
remains in Nairobi. Then, local stakeholders 
could decide on spending and staffing priorities 
across agriculture, livestock, fisheries, irrigation 
etc.
Local control would almost certainly lead to 
greater emphasis on front-line service provision: 
either more staff in field-based positions and 
fewer in office posts or fewer overall, but with 
greater provision for transport and other facili-
tating factors e.g. mobile phone airtime, money 
for demonstrations etc. Stakeholders also hoped 
that some budget could remain to be allocated 
through flexible processes to other uses in the 
manner the Constituency Development Fund 
(CDF) is supposed to be used. 
Would decentralisation lead to better plan-
ning and greater accountability of service 
providers? Should extension and other publicly 
delivered agricultural services be under the 
control of locally elected officials, taking views 
of local stakeholders into account, rather than 
the top down system Kenya has operated under 
for the last 60 years? These are some of the possi-
b i l i t i e s  o p e n e d  u p  u n d e r  t h e  n e w 
constitution. 
The move toward better service delivery 
through some devolved consultation structures 
has been happening for some time. District 
based stakeholder forums have been engaged 
in consultation and collaboration for a number 
of years, but have no power to influence budgets 
or to hold service providers to account for their 
performance. Often they do not even know 
what the budget is. The four case study districts 
have stakeholder forums at various stages of 
development, with Eldoret West having among 
the best developed. What role can such an insti-
tution play in improving participatory planning 
and accountability under a decentralised admin-
istrative system?
International experience suggests that 
decentralisation is no panacea. Local decision 
makers can be captured by local elites (e.g. larger 
farmers) as easily as national elites are. Within 
Kenya the operations of the CDFs show the 
potential for elite capture and misappropriation 
of devolved funds. Services only become more 
responsive where citizens are organised, 
eloquent, vigilant or well-connected – and this 
can count against the poor. Nevertheless, there 
are undoubtedly efficiency improvements that 
could be realised through a more decentralised 
approach to the delivery of agricultural services 
in as agro-ecologically, infrastructurally and 
culturally heterogeneous country as Kenya. 
Within such a system the current stakeholder 
forums (with appropriate new powers) could 
play a valuable role in both planning and holding 
service providers to account. The details of how 
agricultural services will be delivered needs to 
be addressed as part of the roll out of the new 
constitution. So far nobody is talking about it.
Endnotes:
(1) The four case study reports can be downloaded from: 
www. future-agricultures.org. They are based on fieldwork 
conducted by young researchers who undertook key 
informant interviews, farmer focus group discussions, and 
held a validation/feedback workshop in each district that 
was attended by the senior researchers.
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